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ABSTRACT
The nuclear power industry of the Federal Republic of Germany
has achieved consistently better reactor operating performance than
has the U.S. industry. Earlier work has suggested that a major
source of the difference is in capacity factor losses caused by
regulatory practices. An investigation of the problems attributed
to regulation in the United States, which caused losses from 1975 to
1984, was performed. Fifteen major issues were identified, which
comprised 85 percent of all regulatory losses. The performance of
the German industry then was analyzed to discover differences in
'-[ regulatory practices.
Most of the U.S. regulatory losses were found to be associated
with steam generators, reactor coolant systems, and containment
systems. The regulatory losses in the Federal Republic of Germany
included the retraining of a plant staff after an accident, a
Af long-term derating of a plant because of inadequate backup safety
systems, and several smaller problems. The German industry applies
inspection and repair standards for steam generators that equal or
exceed U.S regulations, and it treats these losses as part of normal
plant maintenance. However, the German industry also assigned thei4 largest single cause of capacity loss in BWRs--recirculation pipe
replacement--to the voluntary maintenance category because they
weren't strictly ordered to shut down, only pressured with the
threat of stringent inspection standards. When the BWR pipe
replacement outages were added to the Federal Republic of Germany's
total regulatory loss, and the steam generator losses were
subtracted from the U.S. total, the Federal Republic of Germany was
found to have greater regulatory losses. It can therefore be
concluded that the sources of poor U.S. performance relative to the
X Federal Republic of Germany come from areas other than regulation.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Kent F. Hansen
Title: Professor of Nuclear Engineering
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Chapter 1
1.0 Nuclear Power Performance
1.1 Introduction
The U.S. commercial nuclear power program has been operating for
over twenty-five years. At the end of 1984, there were 77 large
light water reactor (WR) nuclear plants in commercial operation,
each having a generating capacity of 400 megawats electric (MWe) or
more. About three-fifths of these plants had been in operation for
at least ten years. Despite this wealth of experience, the U.S.
industry has failed to match the performance records of the nuclear
industries of several other countries.
The purpose of this project is to examine some of the reasons
for the differences in performance between LWRs in the United States
and the Federal Republic of Germany. It is a follow-on to a similar
study of the industries in the two countries which identified losses
attributed to regulation as one of the chief differences in
performance. [1]
In the initial work, the measure of performance used was the
capacity factor, the energy produced by a given plant in a year
divided by the energy which would have been produced if the plant
had been running at full power for every minute of the year. Plant
capacity factors in the United States and the Federal Republic of
Germany from 1980 to 1983 were compared. The results showed the
U.S. pressurized water reactors (PWR) performing at an average
capacity factor of 58.3 percent and the FRG PWRs at 77.1 percent.
The capacity losses were characterized as scheduled outages, forced
outages, and regulatory outages. Over 40 percent of the overall
performance difference between the two countries arose from the
difference in the regulatory category.
While the U.S. industry attributed 7.7 percent of total capacity
losses to regulation, the German industry credited regulation with
less than 0.1 percent of its losses. This report focuses in
particular on the origins of these regulatory differences.
The Federal Republic of Germany is only one of several countries
which employ light water reactor technologies similar to the United
States. The FRG program is, however, older than most others and has
a large enough number of both boiling and pressurized water reactors
to make relevant comparisons.
1.2 The Cost of Poor Performance
Nuclear power plants in the United States have a lower operating
cost than all other base load supply systems except hydro. Hydro
power is not available in many parts of either the United States or
the FRG and thus those utilities which own nuclear plants would
generally like to operate them as much as possible. When a nuclear
plant is shut down, a utility must either run its more expensive
power plants or purchase power from another utility to meet its
demand. The cost of replacement power varies across the country and
with the seasons. It is also strongly affected by oil prices. A
rough figure for the cost of replacement power is $1,000/MWe-day.
Thus, each day that a 1,000 MWe plant is out of service costs
$1,000,000 in purchased power. At the end of 1984 there were 65,000
MWe of nuclear power capacity installed. A one-percent improvement
in the performance of the nuclear industry would reduce the need for
purchased power by 234,000 MWe-days per year, or $234,000,000 per
year.
The value of even a small improvement in the performance of the
U.S. industry is thus apparent and is the justification for this
research. Any differences in operation which could push the U.S.
capacity factors towards those of the FRG without reducing safety
are worth hundreds of millions of dollars each year.
1.3 Scope of the Study
This study examines the performance of all light water reactors
with net ratings above 300 MWe from the beginning of 1975 until the
end of 1984 in the United States and the FRG. This period was
chosen because of the availability of performance data, because it
spanned the accident at Three Mile Island and might show any effects
which regulation had upon performance from that event, and because
it provided a large enough set of data points from both countries to
make relevant comparisons. A study reaching further back in time
would find very few German plants to compare with the United
States. Two German plants which came into commercial operation in
late 1984 have not been included.
1.4 Outline of the Thesis
This report begins with a description of the structures of the
American and German nuclear power industries in Chapter 2. The
regulatory process in the two countries is reviewed as part of this
general description.
The sources of U.S. capacity loss which have been attributed to
regulation are examined in Chapter 3. The U.S. utilities have
reported all their outages in great detail and in this chapter all
the regulatory outages for each plant are sorted to determine the
problems which have led to regulatory loss.
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The U.S. industry's perceptions of the regulatory issues are
examined in Chapter 4, which includes the results of a series of
interviews conducted with U.S. industry officials. The latter
provide additional insight into the history of these problems as
well as an understanding of the interactions between members of the
industry.
A parallel analysis of FRG industry experience is presented in
Chapter 5. A comparison of the problems encountered in the German
and U.S. industries is made, focusing on problems which arose in
both countries, including causes of regulatory losses in the United
States, which were not attributed to regulation in the FRG.
Finally, differences in regulation and operating practices and
their effect on performance are discussed in Chapter 6. Differences
in the nature of responses to problems are highlighted including
issues which were problems for only one country. In addition,
several proposals for changes in U.S. industry practices are made,
along with recommendations for future work.
-4-
Chapter 2
2.0 Industry Structure
2.1 United States
2.1.1 Nuclear Power Generation
In 1975, twenty-three utilities operated thirty-eight nuclear
plants with a capacity of 27,865 MWe that accounted for 9 percent of
total electricity generation. [2][3] By 1984, thirty-seven
utilities operated seventy-seven plants with a capacity of 65,049
MWe that provided 13.6 percent of total electricity generation. The
breakdown for each of the years of the study period is listed in
Table 2.1. A list of all the U.S. plants in the study is given in
Appendix 1.
2.1.2 Safety Regulation
In the United States, regulation of nuclear power plant safety
is a Federal responsibility. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) has been empowered by the United States Congress under the
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 and the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
with ensuring the safe operation of civilian nuclear power. Towards
this end, the NRC is "authorized to conduct such reasonable
inspections and other enforcement activities as needed to insure
compliance. . " with safety regulations. [4]
2.1.3 Economic Regulation
The economic regulation of the investor-owned utilities is
performed within each state by an agency which henceforth will be
referred to as a Public Utility Commission (PUC). (Although the
name may vary from state to state, the purpose is roughly
-5-
LWR's IN THE UNITED STATES
No. of
Utilities
28
30
.- 34
35
35
35
35
35
36
37
Total
Megawatts
33,938
37,689
44,928
47,841
49,531
50,443
55,622
56,770
59,726
65,049
Percent
of Total
Generation
9.0%
9.4
11.8
12.5
11.4
11.0
11.9
12.6
12.7
13.5
Sources: Columns 2, 3, and 4 from the INPO database.
Column 5, Energy Facts 1984, Energy Information
Administration, US Department of Energy,
DOE/EIA-0469, May 1985, p. 38.
Table 2.1
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YEAR
No. of
Plants
1975 45
1976 49
1977 57
1978 60
1979 62
1980 63
1981 68
1982 69
1983 72
1984 77
-4
identical.) The utilities have been granted local monopolies to
provide electricity, and the PUCs have the right to regulate
electricity prices to prevent monopolistic pricing. In return for
the price regulation, each utility is assured a fair rate of return
on all prudent capital investments and allowed to recover all
reasonably incurred costs.
During the 1950s and 1960s the cost of electricity steadily
declined as utilities kept building larger power plants and
achieving greater economies of scale. The PUCs and the utilities
worked together to set rates and drew little attention because the
costs were falling. All this changed in the early 1970s when oil
shortages led to sharply higher prices. Then, utilities began to
apply for rate increases nearly every month, and the rate hearings
became the focus for consumer groups angry over these price rises.
The PUCs came under intense pressure to hold prices down and this
led to a change from a cooperative to an adversarial relationship
between the PUCs and the utilities. [5] This pressure to hold down
prices has eased little since the early 1970s and the adversarial
relationship still exists across most of the United States.
2.1.4 Industry Collaboration
The U.S. nuclear power industry relies upn several industry
organizations for technical support, including, most notably, the
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) and the Electric Power
Research Institute (EPRI). EPRI is a research organization which
receives its funding on a voluntary basis from the U.S. utilities
and performs studies in areas of interest to those utilities,
including nuclear power plant technology. INPO is dedicated solely
-7-
US LIGHT WATER REACTOR
NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY VENDORS
(as of 31 December 1984)
Vendor
Babcock and Wilcox
Combustion
Engineering
Westinghouse
General Electric
Total PWR
Total BWR
All LWR
52
25
77
Table 2.2
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Type
PWR
PWR
PWR
BWR
Total
9
11
32
25
to nuclear power. Most of its employees are from nuclear utilities,
and stay with INPO for two years, afterwards returning to their jobs
·, in the industry. INPO's task is to support operations by collecting
information on the operation of the nuclear plants and sharing this
information with all utilities so as to help them achieve high
levels of performance.
2.1.5 Manufacturers
In the United States, there are four manufacturers of large
light water reactor nuclear steam supply systems (NSSS): Babcock
I and Wilcox, Combustion Enginering, and Westinghouse Electric, which
produce pressurized water reactors (PWRs); and General Electric
I (GE), the only boiling water reactor (BWR) manufacturer. The
industry is dominated by Westinghouse and GE, as can be seen by the
data listed in Table 2.2. Because there have been no new orders
recently, these manufacturers now concern themselves primarily with
providing services for plants in operation.
2.1.6 Design and Construction
With few exceptions, the U.S. utilities have gone outside their
4 own staffs for the design and construction of their nuclear plants,
relying on firms known as Architect/Engineers (AEs) to do the
detailed engineering work for all the non-NSSS equipment. The
contracting utility may then hire another AE to perform the
J construction or may manage construction itself. The plants in the
study have used nine AEs and eleven constructors, while six of the
utilities have provided at least a part of the architecturalj engineering services and eleven have served as the construction
manager.
2.2 Federal Republic of Germany
2.2.1 Nuclear Power Supply
At the beginning of the study period in 1975, three large
nuclear plants were operating with a total capacity of 1,610 MWe.
Several smaller LWRs and non-LWR plants were also in service, and
together these nuclear plants accounted for 9.2 percent of total
electricity generation. [6][7] By the end of the study period in
1984, eleven large LWRs were in service with a capacity of 9,798 MWe
and the nuclear industry provided 27.6 percent of total electricity
generation. [8] This breakdown for each of the years of the study
is listed in Table 2.3.
The utilites are all investor-owned, but the predominant
investors are the land (or state) governments. Appendix 2 lists the J
German plants in the study.
2.2.2 Safety Regulation
Until 1955, the FRG was prohibited by the Western Allies from
developing nuclear power. By the end of 1959, the FRG's Atomic
Energy Act was enacted, [9] and the German Constitution was amended
to allow Federal laws to stipulate that, with the approval of the
Federal Council, the states will enforce designated laws. The
Atomic Energy Act of the FRG took advantage of this change to set
out the guidelines for nuclear power and then charge the states with
enforcement. Each state holds the responsibility for the safety of
the operating plants.
-10-
NUCLEAR POWER IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
Nuclear
Generation
(GWh)
21,864
24,348
35,153
35,008
41,609
42,619
52,492
62,448
64,660
91,444
Total
Generation
(GWh)
238,456
267,613
268,760
238,569
298,644
298,494
301,574
303,256
310,935
331,187
Percent
Nuclear Generation
9.2%
9.1
13.1
12.3
13.9
14.3
17.4
20.6
20.8
27.6
"Die Offentliche Elektrizitgtsversorgung" 1982 and
1983, Vereingung Deutscher Elektizitatwerke,
Frankfurt.
"Elektizitatswirtschaft", 1985, Vereingung
Deutscher Elektizit6:twerke, Frankfurt.
Table 2.3
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Year
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
Sources:
Within the Federal government, the Federal Minister of the
Interior (Bundesminister des Innern or BMI) is responsible for the
regulations promulgated under the Atomic Energy Act. The Federal
government and the state governments then rely upon several private
organizations to draft regulations and oversee their implementation.
2.2.2.1 The Nuclear Safety Standards Commission - KTA
In 1972, the Federal Minister of the Interior established the
Nuclear Safety Standards Commission (Kerntechnischer Ausschuss or
KTA) to bring together all the participants in the nuclear industry
with sufficient expertise in nuclear power to develop safety
standards. Five groups of ten members each are represented on the
KTA: the manufacturers and constructors, the owners and operators,
independent experts, Federal authorities and state authorities, and
organizations with special technical knowledge.
The KTA meets in task groups which draft the safety
regulations. The drafts are reviewed by KTA subcommittees and then
issued for three months for public comment. After the regulation
has been finalized it must then be approved by a 5/6 majority of the
KTA. Thus, if one of the five member groups is opposed to it, the
regulation will not pass. Although an approved regulation is not
law, failure to comply with it imperils the plant's license. [10]
2.2.2.2 The Reactor Safety Commission - RSK
While the BMI waits for the KTA to agree upon regulations, it
relies upon the Reactor Safety Commission (Reaktor
Sicherheitskommission or RSK) to provide guidelines on the design,
-12-
construction, and operation of nuclear power plants. The RSK has
twenty members, all of whom are personally appointed by the Federal
Minister of the Interior. The members are chosen from the following
fields: reactor operations; civil and mechanical engineering;
thermodynamics; chemical engineering; materials;-construction;
instrumentation and controls; reactor physics; electrical
engineering; reactor chemistry; radiation protection; environmental
protection; radiation biology; and nuclear medicine.
The appointments are personal and voluntary. Each member
represents not the organization for which he or she works but the
expertise for which he or she is chosen. The RSK guidelines do not
enjoy the full weight of law but are used for reference by the BMI
and the states while the KTA develops its regulations. [10]
2.2.2.3 The Reactor Safety Association - GRS
The Reactor Safety Association (Gesellschaft fur
Reaktorsicher-heit or GRS) is one of the independent experts used by
the BMI and the states. It peforms technical studies on the safety
of nuclear facilities and radiation protection, and participates in
the formulation of guidelines and regulations by the RSK and KTA.
Upon request by the government agencies, the GRS undertakes analyses
of specific safety issues. The GRS is responsible for the
management of the German light water reactor safety research
program. [10].
-13-
2.2.2.4 The Technical Inspection Agencies - TUVs
There are eleven Technical Inspection Agencies (Technische
Uberwachungs-Vereine or TUV) in Germany and each one of them is a
private, independent company. The TUVs have existed for over one
hundred years, serving as independent inspectors for industry. They
are similar in nature to Underwriters Laboratories in the United
States but much broader in scope, performing inspections of
equipment ranging from pressure vessels to motor vehicles. Seven of
the eleven TUVs have departments devoted to nuclear power. The TVs
perform inspections and tests of plants during construction and
operation. [10]
2.2.3 Economic Regulation
Regulation of the price of electricity in the FRG is handled in
each state by the Ministry for Trade and Commerce. The ministry is
expected to review the costs of applying electricity and then
establish a rate structure to cover the costs and provide a fair
rate of return. The utilities are able to negotiate private
contractors with large industrial customers and these contracts are
not subject to review by the ministry. The cost reviews performed
by the ministries consist only of a verification of the actual costs
and that the costs were consistent with other projects of similar
scope.
2.2.4 Industry Collaboration
In addition to the research provided to the industry by GRS, the
German electric utility industry relies upon the work of the
-14-
Association of Large Power Plant Operators (Vereinigung der
Grosskraftwerksbetreiber or VGB) for research on performance. The
VGB is a predominantly German organization, which, however also
includes members from most of the European nations as well as the
United States, Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, India, and
Australia. It has a small permanent staff and many large committees
which meet only a few times a year. The committees are charged with
the task of studying specific problems and preparing recommendations
on the solution of these problems. Like EPRI, their work is not
limited to nuclear power, but covers all areas of power production.
[ll]
2.2.5 The Manufacturers
Over the years there have been four vendors of light water NSSS
in Germany, but now there are only two. In the early years, Siemens
and AEG competed for orders, with Siemens offering PWRs and AEG
BWRs. In 1969, these two companies began to merge their nuclear
operations into a new company named Kraftwerk Union (KWU), and the
last stages of the merger were completed in 1973. The pace of the
merger was dictated by licensing agreements which the parent firms
held with Westinghouse and General Electric. Another company is
Brown-Boveri which has designed only one plant that has not yet come
into service. Thus, all the plants in this study have been
manufactured by either KWU or its parents.
KWU owns very little of the actual manufacturing equipment and
has little capital invested in the nuclear industry. The
manufacture of almost all parts of the NSSS are subcontracted out.
-15-
2.2.6 Design and Construction
The design and construction of plants in the FRG has been
handled almost exclusively by KWU. In the instances where KWU
wasn't the sole NSSS and, turbine-generator manufacturer, AE, and
Constructor, the job has been done by its parents AEG or Siemens, or
begun by them and completed by KWU.
All plants were turn-key in the sense that the utilities did not
accept ownership of a plant until it had been operating
uninterrupted at full power for a month. The costs were fixed with
the agreement that the contract would be renegotiated in the event
of changes in regulation. The contracts also stipulated that KWU
would pay a percentage of all changes whether requested by the
utilities, demanded by the regulators, or recommended by its own
staff. The KWU contracts have included performance guarantees for
the first two years of operation. Barring operator errors, KWU
would pay penalties for a plant with low availability. The
agreement for the Krummel plant guarantees 70 percent energy
availability in the first year and 75 percent in the second year.
lKrummel began commercial operation in late 1984 and was not part
of this study.
-16-
Chapter 3
3.0 U.S. Data Analysis
The S.M. Stoller Corporation is conducting an ongoing study of
nuclear power performance for the Electric PowerResearch Institute
(EPRI). Using the Monthly Operating Reports submitted to the NRC,
supplemented by the NRC Gray Books, Licensee Event Reports (LERs)
'Nuclear Power Experience', technical papers, and contacts with the
operators of individual units, they have compiled the Operating
Plant Evaluation Code (OPEC-2) data base. [12] OPEC-2 describes
every outage or derating at a U.S. plant over 400 MWe, providing
explicit information on the system and component responsible for the
outage. It also lists any external events which led to the outage,
along with a brief written description of the outage. The external
events include operator error, preventive maintenance, and several
regulatory categories. Appendix 3 shows the level of coding and
categories within each level. More recently, INPO has assumed
responsibility from EPRI for maintaining the OPEC-2 database.
The OPEC-2 file was made available to MIT by INPO for this
project subject to the condition that no plant or utility be
specifically identified. The data has been used to identify areas
of significant capacity loss across the industry.
3.1 Data Analysis
3.1.1 Selection of Regulatory Outages
The data was sorted for all events with a regulatory coding as
the external cause of event. There were two additional groups of
events which had not been coded as regulatory in OPEC-2 but were
-17-
judged to be regulatory in nature. These were certain fuel
limitations relevant to plant safety and intake and discharge water
restrictions. The fuel limitations were considered regulatory
because they resulted from regulations which restricted the
operation of the plant. In addition, the intake/discharge water
restrictions are based upon regulations of the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA). They limit flow rates and temperature
differentials to prevent damage to fish and plant life near the
power plant. All the codes used to identify regulatory events are
shown in Table 3.1.
Using these two sets of criteria for sorting during the study
period, 5,102 events were identified as regulatory out of a total of
37,492 events in the OPEC-2 file.
3.1.2 Preliminary Analysis
The first analysis of the regulatory data was by major system so
as to determine which systems most often had regulatory problems.
The hours lost by each system for all U.S. plants in each year were
calculated and then divided by the total hours for these plants in
each year. The result was an average capacity loss factor for each
system for each year.
The results of this analysis are listed in Table 3.2, they show
two things: that a pronounced increase in the regulatory capacity
losses began in 1979; and that most of the problems occurred in the
Containment, Steam Generator, and Reactor Coolant systems, and the
Undefined category. The contribution of the two TMI units has been
subtracted from the yearly totals to show that while their
contribution to capacity loss has been significant, it has not been
-18-
REGULATORY OUTAGE CODES
OF THE OPEC-2 DATABASE
All Events with the External Influence Descriptions:
NRC Originated
o Regulatory/Operational limit (Safety Limit of Tech Spec)
o Regulatory requirement to inspect for possible deficiency
o Regulatory requirement to modify equipment due to
malfunction or construction/design deficiencies
o Regulatory requirement to modify equipment due to more
restrictive criteria
o NRC licensing proceedings and hearings
o Unavailability of safety-related equipment
Additional categories added to the sort:
Fuel and Core, Safety Restrictions
o ECCS peaking factor (PWR)
o EOL scram reactivity/rod worth restrictions (includes
shutdown margin
o Core tilt/Xenon restriction (out of flux band)
o BWR thermal limits (includes "rod limited")
o Thermal power restrictions
o Reactivity coefficient (e.g., mod. temp. coeff.)
Ciculating ptertr vice Water System, Intakes/dischargeso xcess vi is
o EPA discharge limit
Table 3.1
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the only factor in the increased capacity losses. Undefined" are
events for which the utilities did not specify a system, and this
was the category into which most of the THI losses fell. The
"Other" category includes all plant systems which individually had a
very small influence on regulatory capacity loss.
The data was further separated into Containment, Steam
Generator, Reactor Coolant, and Undefined files and each reviewed
separately.
3.2 System by System Analysis
The task when analyzing the specific systems was to identify the
problems in each system which caused the losses. The losses
attributed to Containment, Steam Generator, Reactor Coolant, and TMI
1 & 2 during the ten year study period are shown in Table 3.3 as
percentages of total regulatory loss. They account for nearly
four-fifths of all regulatory losses.
The losses in each system are further broken down by the
external events and are shown in Tables 3.4 (a), (b), and (c). The
Containment was most often influenced by inspections and
modifications for deficiencies. The "all of the above" category was
specified most frequently for the Reactor Coolant system losses.
The losses in the Steam Generator were blamed on violations of the
technical specifications and inspections.
3.2.1 Containment Outages
Over half of the Containment outage hours were attributed to
modifications for deficiencies and a review of the hours lost was
-21-
PRINCIPAL SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTING TO
REGULATORY CAPACITY LOSS
(percent of total regulatory losses)
System
Containment
Reactor Coolant
Steam Generator
TMI 1 & 2
Percent
27.7%
17.8
16.2
16.6
78.3%
Table 3.3
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carried out to determine what these deficiencies were and what the
corrective action was. As can be seen in Table 3.2 the problems
began in 1979, peaked in 1980 and have declined somewhat since
then. The outage hours were attributed to modifications to the
Torus in BWRs and a group of Inspection and Enforcement Bulletins
IF (IEBs) related to seismic analysis of safety system piping. The
next two subsections will describe these issues in some detail. The
precise losses resulting from these causes are shown in Tables 3.5
and 3.6.
1 3.2.1.1 Torus Modifications
In 1975 General Electric recognized that some of the
I hydrodynamic loads of the Mark I containment had not properly been
taken into account. The NRC, with industry compliance, established
;] a two-track approach to solving the problem. A short term program
| was begun to determine the extent of the inadequacies of the earlier
design and to identify any serious safety problems. The long term
'! program was to develop recommendations for the permanent resolution
of the deficiencies. The long-term study was due in 1979 and was
I issued as NUREG-0660, a description of the acceptable resolutions.
The implementation of these solutions began in 1979. The short term
program had virtually no effect on operations. All the losses were
j caused by the modifications to the torus recommended by the long
term program.
3.2.1.2 Seismic Analysis Bulletins
Three seismic analysis bulletins were issued:
j (a) IEB 79-02: Pipe Support Base Plate Designs Using Concrete
Expansion Anchor Bolts.
-23-
This bulletin applied to all operating licensees and holders of
construction permits and was issued after an operating plant,
Millstone Unit 1 in Waterford, CT, discovered the structural failure
of some of its pipe supports and, further, that some of those still
intact had not been properly tightened. Deficiency reports filed at
Shoreham in Brookhaven, NY, a plant under construction, indicated
that design of base plates using rigid plate assumptions has
resulted in underestimation of loads on some anchor bolts. Initial
investigation indicated that nearly fifty percent of the base plates
could not be assumed to behave as rigid plates." The bulletin
directed all licensees and permit holders to verify that the
flexibility of the base plates was taken into account in the
calculation of the anchor bolt loads, that a sufficient margin of
safety existed between the bolt design load and bolt ultimate
capacity, and that the design requirements for cyclic loading had
been met. [13]
(b) IEB 79-14: Seismic Analyses for As-Built Safety-Related Piping
Systems
This bulletin was issued to all licensees for action and permit
holders for information. It indicated that the analysis of piping
systems had been performed at some plants with drawings that did not
match the installed configuration. Licensees were ordered to
inspect the piping, prepare precise as-built drawings (drawings
which showed the precise installed piping configuration),
recalculate all seismic loads, evaluate the non-conformances, and
correct as needed. [14]
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ICHARACTERIZATION OF EVENTS
BY SYSTEM
Total Plant Hours 1975-1984: 5,319,601.0
Total Regulatory Loss Hours: 568,226.3 = 10.7X
Total Regulatory Events : 5,102
Containment (157,584.9 Hours, 462 Events)
Event
Tech Spec Viol.
Inspections
Mod. for Deficiency
Mod. for Regulation
Licensing
Hours
1971.6
34228.8
88473.0
20215.8
12741.9
No. of
Items
44
192
166
36
18
458
XHours .
1.3
21.7
56.1
12.8
8.1
Hours/
Item
44.8
178.3
533.0
561.6
707.9
(a)
Reactor Coolant System (101225.6 Hours, 633 Events)
Event
Tech Spec Viol.
Inspections
Mod. for Deficiency
Mod. for Regulation
All of the Above
No. of
Hours Items
7670.0 156
20573.4 308
16094.6 45
10189.2 21
46391.8 99
629
(b)
Steam Generator (92208.9 Hours, 264 Items)
Event
Tech Spec Viol.
Inspections
Mod. for Deficiency
No. of
Hours Items
40598.5 133
44510.2 119
-6980.2 11
263
(c)
Table 3.4
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I
I
-1
t
7
%Hours
7.6
20.3
15.9
10.1
45.8
Hours/
Item
49.2
92.9
357.6
118.6
468.6
%Hours
44.0
48.3
7.6
Hours/
Item
305.3
374.0
634.6
.1
I
(c) IEB 79-07: Seismic Stress Analysis of Safety-Related Piping
By this bulletin, the NRC directed five power plants to shut
down when a review of seismic analysis computer codes determined
that a code in use did not properly evaluate the loads during a
seismic event. The bulletin ordered all licensees and permit
holders to identify the calculation methods used in the computer
analyses, provide complete listings of the pertinent sections of the
computer programs, and verify that the results were checked against
"benchmark problems or compared to other piping computer programs."
[15]
3.2.2 Reactor Coolant System
Nearly half of the hours lost in the Reactor Coolant System
(RCS) fell into the category "all of the above", as can be seen in
Table 3.4(b). The utilities did not identify only one type of NRC
event as the cause. Another quarter of the outages were described
as inspections. When investigated, the inspections covered
virtually all the components in the RCS and ranged from isolation
valve tests which lasted for less than an hour to ten year
in-service inspections of the reactor vessel lasting several
months. The "all of the above" category events, however, had to do
with a single issue, Intergrannular Stress Corrosion Cracking
(IGSCC).
This cracking occurred in an unstabilized austenitic stainless
steel designated Type 304. The steel had been recognized as far
back as the 1920s as being susceptible to IGSCC, but only under
highly corrosive environments and conditions of high stress. The
water in the recirculation system of a BWR is of high purity; it is
demineralized, cleaned of organic material, and its pH is controlled
within a narrow range. The stresses and corrosive environment known
to cause IGSCC were believed to be absent in BWRs when the 304 steel
was chosen.
3.2.3 Steam Generator Losses
The Steam Generator losses were evenly split-between violations
of the technical specifications and inspections as shown in Table
3.4(c), but a close review of the descriptions of the hours lost
indicated that many of the hours in each category were actually for
tube repairs and replacements. These were problems discovered
during a scheduled inspection or when a violation of the technical
specificaton necessitated a shutdown. These outages lasted anywhere
from several months up to a year, during which time some of the
steam generators were completely replaced.
This representation of the Steam Generator losses as
'regulatory' demonstrated the limitations of the coding of events.
The data were therefore reassigned into the following three
categories: repairs; Tech Spec violations, and inspections. Many
of the hours of what had originally been identified as Tech Spec
violations and inspections were reclassified as repairs. For
example, an inspection outage which lasted more than one month was
classified as a repair for the entire length of the outage because
steam generator inspections, while lengthy, simply don't take more
time than that. Further justification for this reclassification
comes from the written descriptions of each event, which stated the
purpose of the outages in most cases to be plugging or general
repairs.
-27-
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3.3 Data Reclassification
Having reclassified the data in the steam generator category,
the reclassification was applied to the outages in all systems.
Many of the outage hours of inspections in the Reactor Coolant
system were determined to be IGSCC events while other RCS
inspections were unrelated to IGSCC and were left in that category.
Other IGSCC hours were identified in the Core Cooling/Safety
Injection System. Outage hours caused by the Inspection and
Enforcement Bulletin on the improper seismic analysis computer code
(IEB 79-07) were found to appear in three different systems: RCS,
Containment, and Core Cooling/Safety Injection System. The results
of this reclassification are shown in Tables 3.5 and 3.6, which show
a total of fifteen outage causes. These fifteen causes capture
five-sixths of all the regulatory outages, the remaining hours are
spread through all other systems. Table 3.5 shows the total losses
of the fifteen issues and in which systems they occurred, while
Table 3.6 shows the time history of when the events occurred and
their effect in each year. These significant issues will now be
discussed in detail.
3.4 Significant Issues
Several general observations can be made about Table 3.6 before
taking up the specific issues. First, only nine of these issues
occurred before the end of 1979 and of those nine, six have been the
cause of capacity loss in at least nine of the ten study years.
These six constitute the on-going losses. Second, four of the
issues appeared for three years or less and none of them have
recurred.
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3.4.1 IGSCC
Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking capacity losses first
arose in 1976, again in 1977 and from 1981 to date with significant
increases in each of the last two study years.
3.4.2 Torus Modifications
The losses associated with the redesign of the Mark I
containments began in 1979, were constant for the next three years,
and then fell off by 1984.
3.4.3 Steam Generator Repairs
Steam Generator repairs have been a persistent source of
capacity loss from 1978 to the present. These repairs are made to
steam generators which fail to meet their technical specifications
for allowable leakage rates or are no longer efficient due to the
number of tubes plugged.
3.4.3 Seismic Bulletins 79-02 and 79-14
These two bulletins, one concerning the calculations made on the
design of pipe support base plates and the other on the differences
between the actual pipe layout and seismic calculations, first
appeared in 1979. They had a large effect on performance in 1980
and then swiftly dwindled in significance.
3.4.5 General Seismic
Several units were shut down for extended periods while site
specific seismic design issues between utilities and the NRC were
being resolved. In a few cases the outages were quite long.
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3.4.6 Steam Generator Technical Specification Violations
This is an on-going issue, and Table 3.6 indicates that these
resulting losses have been increasing over the period of the study.
The violations are attributed to temperature deviations, excessive
leak rates, water chemistry, and other problems.
3.4.7 Steam Generator Inspections
The losses attributed to Steam Generator inspections are one of
the on-going regulatory loss issues. In the years from 1975 to
1978, they accounted for over one-third of the regulatory capacity
losses. These inspections are required by the technical
specifications either directly or by reference to the ASME Code.
3.4.8 Seismic Computer Code
Bulletin 79-07 was issued in April 1979 and directly affected
five plants, four of which had immediate outages, and the fifth was
being held out of service after a steam generator replacement. Each
plant stayed down for roughly half a year.
3.4.9 TMI Modifications
These were the modifications to plants required by the accident
at Three Mile Island and were performed from 1979 through 1981.
About equal time was spent in 1979 and 1980 with a pronounced
decline by 1981. Since then, no more capacity losses have been
attributed to this cause.
-32-
3.4.10 Reactor Coolant System Inspections
This is one of the on-going issues of capacity loss. The
inspections which were clearly related to IGSCC problems have
already been subtracted from this category. The inspections are
required under the technical specifications either directly or by
invoking the ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code. Some of the
inspection requirements also appear in the Code of Federal
Regulations, Title 10, Part 55.
3.4.11 Integrated Leak Tests
Containment integrity tests appear in the last nine years of the
study. They are performed at the end of a prolonged outage to
ensure that the containment does not leak and are required by the
regulations of 10 CFR 50 Appendix J.
3.4.12 Feedwater Cracks
The NRC issued IEB 79-13 in June 1979 with revisions in August
and October after inspections at several PWRs revealed cracks in the
feedwater nozzles leading to the steam generators. All operating
PWRs were directed to inspect their feedwater systems and report
their findings to the NRC. Any plant which discovered violations of
the piping design criteria laid out in the ASME Code was to effect
repairs. This problem was dealt with almost entirely in 1979 with a
little finishing work in 1980 and is one of the one-time problems
which has not recurred. 16]
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3.4.13 Reactor Coolant Technical Specification Violations
Violations of the technical specifications governing the
temperature, pressure, and water chemistry of the reactor coolant
systems have occurred in every year of the study and have always
been a small part of the losses. These losses have been constant
over the period of the study.
3.4.14 Snubber Inspections
This is the last of the on-going regulatory inspection issues,
another problem which has never amounted to very much in a
particular year but has been a persistent source of loss. Snubbers
are the pipe restraints on the large piping systems. The snubber
and the pipe are both subject to fatigue and the technical
specifications or the ASME Code require that they be inspected
periodically.
3.4.15 TMI Units 1 & 2
The two TMI units were shut down in 1979. Unit 2 will not
return to service but Unit 1 has operated in 1985 and is returning
to service in 1986. The losses to overall capacity factor have been
substantial but, as stated previously, have not been the sole cause
of the difference in performance between the United States and the
FRG.
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CHAPTER 4
4.0 Interviews with U.S. Utility and NRC Personnel
A series of interviews was conducted with utility officials and
members of the staff of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The
purpose of these interviews was to seek additional insight into the
regulatory issues which have affected performance in the nuclear
industry, and the influence that each has had on plant performance.
All interviews were conducted during the first three months of 1986,
with an agreement of complete confidentiality.
4.1 The Utilities
Interviews were conducted at six of the thirty-seven utilities
which operate the large LWRs considered in this study. Those
interviewed were chosen to provide a cross-section of size,
experience, location, and most important, performance. The
performance standard used was capacity factor. The industry as a
whole achieved an average capacity factor of 59.0 percent for the
ten years of the study. The capacity loss attributed to regulation,
as described in Chapter 3, was 10.7 percent. An overview of the
performance of all systems for all other causes in addition to
regulatory losses is given in Table 4.1. This table also shows the
capacity factors for PWRs and BWRs separately. The regulatory
losses have been subtracted out of each system and are presented in
aggregate in the Regulatory category.
Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of the utilities for both
overall capacity loss and regulatory loss. The overall capacity and
regulatory losses for each utility are calculated as a weighted
-35-
CAPACITY LOSSES IN THE US*
(in percent)
Type of plant: All
Number of plants: 77
Plant-years: 622
Loss Category
Fuel 1.3X
Reactor Coolant Sys. 3.9
Steam Generators 1.6
Condenser 0.6
Condensate/Feedwater 1.4
Turbine 2.0
Generator 1.1
Electrical Systems 0.6
Refueling 11.2
Thermal Eff. Losses 1.7
Core Cooling/SIS 0.5
Fuel & Grid Economic 1.4
Regulatory 10.7
Other 3.0
Total Loss 41.0
Capacity 59.0
*Regulatory losses subtracted
in a separate category.
PWR
52
407
0.4%
3.5
2.5
0.5
1.4
2.0
1.3
0.6
11.9
1.9
0.4
1.0
10.5
2.4
40.2
59.8
from each
BWR
25
215
2.9%
4.7
0.0
0.8
1.5
2.1
0.5
0.6
9.9
1.4
0.7
2.2
11.0
4.1
42.6
57.4
system and totalled
Table 4.1
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average of the years of service for each plant. Thus, a plant which I
only began operations in 1979 has only half as much effect upon the
utility's overall performance figures as a plant which has operated
for all ten years of the study. A weighted average was used so that
no utility would look especially good or bad because of the
performance of a single young plant. In this way, Figure 4.1 I
corresponds to Table 4.1 which uses total hours lost divided by
total plant hours available to calculate the capacity factor. The
plant hours are the sum of all hours in the year from the date that
each plant went into commercial operation until the end of the study
period. The figure does not indicate which utilities have many
plant-years of experience and does not, by agreement with INPO,
identify the individual utilities. It is provided only to show the
range of performance in the industry during the ten years of this
study.
Using the information of Figure 4.1, a group of utilities was
selected for interviews with an eye towards the other criteria
mentioned above. One utility owned only one plant, two utilities
owned two plants, and three of the interviewees operated three or
more plants. The interviews explored the organizational structure
of the nuclear operations within the utility, the organization and
operation of the safety review process, perceptions of federal and
state regulations, and the specific issues identified as regulatory
and described in Chapter 3.
4.1.1 Nuclear Operations within the Utility
The utilities have generally separated the operations associated
with nuclear power plants from their other power sources. The
nuclear organizations are headed by a senior level vice president
with access to the utility's chief executive officer (CEO). Each
organization is divided into two or three areas: Nuclear
Operations, Nuclear Engineering, and perhaps Nuclear Construction.
The final area was found only in the utilities with on-going
projects; in some cases it was a sub-group of Nuclear Engineering
while in others it was a separate division reporting directly to the
CEO. Nuclear Engineering and Nuclear Operations were, in a few
instances, directed by vice presidents who then reported to a senior
vice president.
Nuclear Operations runs the plants. The staff of this division
includes the operators, health physicists, chemists, security, and
other plant personnel. Their responsibility is for the day to day
operation of the plant and, in most cases, they perform little or no
engineering. They may oversee repair and replacement work dictated
by Nuclear Engineering, but only so far as it affects operations.
The size of the staffs vary from 200 to 400 per plant with some of
the multi-unit stations able to share such disciplines as security,
chemistry, and health physics. Operators are not shared except in
the case of twinned units, and then the operator must hold licenses
for both units.
The Nuclear Engineering divisions have responsiblity for
licensing, quality assurance, and engineering analysis. At some of
the utilities they do the actual engineering and procurement for
-39-
repair and replacement while others act only as project managers for
the AE or NSSS vendor doing the work. The size of this division
varied widely depending upon the number of plants in operation and,
if construction was not a separate division, the number of plants
under construction. It ranged from a low of thirty to forty to a
high of 500 for a utility with several plants operating and one
unde'"''construction.
4.1.2 Safety Review
All utilities had an on-site safety review process in which the
directors of all disciplines reviewed operating experience and
decided upon proposed changes in operating practices, expecially if
a change in the plant's Tech Spec or other licensing document would
be required. In most cases, this function is performed by a
committee which meets an average of once a week and is chaired by
the plant or station manager.
Each utility also has an off-site review committee which meets
from one to several times a year. The composition of this committee
differed significantly among the interviewees. Some draw their
members only from within the company, others only from outside, and
a few are mixed. On all the committees, several members have
extensive nuclear power experience and a few members are drawn from
non-nuclear fields. All the members from the utilities are
corporate officers and those from outside hold similar rank within
their own organizations.
These off-site committees review major changes to the operating
license and long term plans for capital expenditures. They may also
-40-
engage in the systematic review of procedures and practices at the
plants and recommend changes in policy. These committees, by being
sufficiently distant from daily operations, can provide the
utilities with a global assessment of plant performance.
4.1.3 The Utilities and Their Regulators
4.1.3.1 The NRC
The utilities generally described their relations with the NRC
staff in Bethesda as good and most got along well with their
respective Regional offices. The relations with the Regionals
differ according to the particular office, with some of the
Regionals described as paternalistic and others adversarial. There
exist instances of strong differences of technical opinion between
the Regionals and the utilities. One utility said that fewer and
fewer of the Resident Inspectors have commercial power experience,
most coming from the Navy's nuclear power program or straight out of
college, and have little knowledge of operations. The utilities
favored the recent reorganization of the NRC staff according to NSSS
groups, although some cautioned that it was still too early to tell
whether the changes would be effective. They all felt that the old
structure had made it too easy for a single technical branch to
affect operations, stating that these groups could insist upon work
without regard for its effect upon overall plant safety or cost.
A frequently cited example of this is the work required under
Appendix R on the separation of redundant components to prevent
simultaneous damage from fire. The utilities uniformly felt that
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the regulations were unnecessarily restrictive and the timetables
unreasonably severe. Most of the work has had little effect on
operations but has been quite costly.
The utilities readily acknowledged that some of the regulatory I
issues were significant technical problems, but the timetables for
resolution of these problems drew much criticism. The utilities 1
felt that they were forced into faster schedules than were needed
from a safety perspective. The result of this was that some of the
issues either caused extended shutdowns when the work could have
been performed over several outages without affecting operations. A
more generous schedule might also have provided the time for more
detailed pre-eingineering which would have led to lower costs.
While this complaint was leveled by nearly all the interviewees, two
provided a contrasting example of how they had performed backfit
work over a five year period with NRC approval while the rest of the
industry had been forced to make corrections within two years.
A few utilities commented on some of the new tools being used by
the NRC, specifically Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) and the
Integrated Schedule Program (ISP). The use of PRA was favored by
the interviewees. They felt that it was an effective way to set
priorities for backfits. One utility observed, however, that a PRA
must exist for each plant to properly evaluate the likelihood and
danger of a problem. Towards that end they treated the PRA of each
of their plants as a "living document", constantly updating it as
the plant changes. They emphasized that a one time PRA is
ineffective, and that it will carry no weight with the NRC. They
also noted that many utilities are openly opposed to developing PRs
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for their plants. The reasons given include: the initial cost of
performing a PRA; a lack of technical capability within the utility;
and a lack of faith in the theory behind PRA. While none of the
interviewees professed a disbelief in PRA, some of them had not
performed PRAs on their plants and had no plans to do so.
The Integrated Schedule Program (ISP) drew mixed comments from
the interviewees. The ISP is intended as a five year plan of
modifications, updated each year, showing the schedule of work
planned, the budget, and a discussion of priorities for the work.
The ISP is then submitted to the NRC for approval. Proponents of
the ISP feel that this will reduce regulatory uncertainty and
shorten outages. One opponent has stated that he does not want to
be locked into a timetable of work and be subject to criticism if
other work turns out to be more pressing. Another objection heard
from was the assertion that the ISP implies that every issue must be
attended to and the only question is when it will be done. To date,
only two utilities have adopted ISPs and several others have
submitted them to the NRC.
4.1.3.2 The PUCs
The Public Utility Commissions (PUCs) have had little effect on
operating performance but several utilities expressed the concern
that this would not be the case in the future. The PUCs can become
involved with operations through two avenues, fuel cost adjustment
hearings and rate cases reviewing capital expenditures.
Most states enacted fuel cost adjustment regulations during the
last decade to allow utilities, revenues to keep pace with the rapid
increases in oil prices. From 1981 through 1985 oil prices were
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stable and fuel cost increases have tended to occur when nuclear
plants were out of service and power had to be purchased elsewhere.
The PUCs have begun setting performance standards for the utilities
with penalties when capacity factors fall below a predetermined
level. One concern was the selection of one operating cycle as the
measure of performance rather than the four year average applied to
fossil plants. As a result, a plant might be unduly penalized for a
problem which arose in a specific cycle, and the operators might be
disinclined to perform preventive maintenance because of the harm to
the capacity factor of one measurement period.
Some PUCs have begun to place limits on any capital expenditures
made by the utilities on their plants. Expenditures above this
limit may not be undertaken without the approval of the PUC. The
intention is to prevent unnecessary work from being performed and
then added to the rate base. The concern of the utilities is that
some of the PUCs lack the technical capability to review this work
and that, even when they do not, the reviews can cause great delays
in needed work. Moreover, a PUC may be trying to manage operations
and thus go beyond its expertise and perhaps its authority. Other
utilities have found PUC staffs second guessing technical judgements
and, although this has had no effect yet, it may prevent utilities
from taking long term action early.
4.1.4 The Issues
The interviewees were affected in varying degrees by the
technical regulatory issues detailed in Section 3.3. This section
deals with comments on these issues.
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- $Some interviewees lost capacity for repair of damage caused by
intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC). Responses to the
.... problem have covered the spectrum of solutions: full pipe
-1 replacement, weld overlay, induction heating stess improvement, and
hydrogen water chemistry. There was general agreement that this
issue was a problem which required repairs. The question of timing
was raised as one utility noted that the NRC appears to be accepting
the leak-before-break concept now, and thus those utilities which
-1 have not performed full pipe replacement may be able to avoid this
costly solution by implementing the other techniques.l
-] The utilities which were affected by IGSCC were also hurt by the
problems discovered in the design of the torus of the Mark I BWRi containment. On this issue there has not been the broad range of
solutions available for IGSCC. The utilities all agreed that the
work was required but their actions differed. One utility had
I prepared an action plan in advance and was able to complete the
repairs over the course of several refuelings without extensive
capacity loss. Another utility had not prepared a response and was
compelled by the NRC to shut down and effect repairs.
ieak-before-break states that the pipe is made of a material
I. strong enough that even if a through-wall crack develops, it will
leak for a long period before it breaks and this leak will be
detected by ordinary monitoring systems. The leaking pipe will be
identified and the operators would then have ample time to repair or
replace the pipe before it broke.
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The seismic bulletins of 1979 (IEB 79-14 and 79-02) drew
criticism from most utilities and only faint praise from the
others. Many doubted the need for this work. The consensus was
that these bulletins, while rooted in specific problems, stemmed
from a more general desire on the part of the NRC to use new
analytical techniques. Also, a belief that the piping systems
should be more rigid and required more pipe restraints, or snubbers,
was held throughout the industry at that time. A few of the
utilities were able to schedule the inspections and subsequent
installations of pipe supports in the shadow of outages but others
felt compelled to shut down and perform all work immediately. The
only favorable comment was oblique. A utility didn't accept the
need for the work, but was able to schedule the work during other
outages, and benefitted from preparing the as-built drawings. It
now has a better description of the plant, and this will help in
engineering future work.
The analysis of Section 3.3 divided steam generator losses into
repairs (Section 3.3.3), Tech Spec violations (Section 3.3.6), and
inspections (Section 3.3.7). The interviewees indicated that the
Tech Spec violations were generally leaks which led to inspections
and sometimes repairs. Concerning the repairs, all the owners
acknowledged that in the absence of regulation, the work would have
been performed anyway. The utilities stated that most inspections
performed during refueling outages would have been performed whether
or not regulations existed and therefore it was unnecessary to call
this problem regulatory. One utility did note, however, that it had
had to shutdown for a mid-cycle inspection and felt this was
appropriately designated a regulatory loss.
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One of the utilities interviewed expressed the view that
shutdowns by the seismic computer code bulletin (IEB 79-07) were an
over-reaction by the NRC. The likelihood that any of the supports
had actually been designed incorrectly coupled with the small chance
of a severe earthquake while the code was being reviewed was
extremely small.
Inspection of the reactor coolant sysem was the tenth most
influential regulatory issue of the analysis of Chapter 3. One
utility commented that some of the in-service inspection
requirements cost time on the critical path of an outage. They felt
that the increased sensitivity of the new ultrasonic inspection
equipment has begun to detect imperfections which have always been
in the welds before but couldn't be seen. They felt that this
increased detection rate was unnecessarily raising the incidence of
required repairs.
One utility commented on the repairs required on feedwater
nozzles following IEB 79-13. They stated that this was a safety
problem but felt that the timetable was burdensome. They felt the
work could have been performed over a longer period with no increase
in public risk and at a far lower cost in dollars and capacity
loss. This utility made the same comments on the torus
modifications.
4.2 The NRC
4.2.1 Regulatory Tools
The NRC has several tools for shutting down a plant but the
staff pointed out that they more often keep a plant from coming back
up than shutting it down in the first place.
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Among the shutdown tools are : Tech Specs; Inspection and
Enforcement Bulletins (IEBs); 10 CRF 50.54f letters; confirmatory
action letters from the regional offices; and show cause orders such
as the order to all Babcock and Wilcox reactors after the accident
at TMI.
After TMI, the number of IEBs issued per year ballooned but has
recentiy declined to a rate of only a few per year. The NRC said .
that for a period they were regulating by bulletin, a practice the
staff described as undesirable. Now there are fewer bulletins
issued but more Information Notices which require no response from
the utilities.
4.2.2 Changes in Regulatory Practices
The NRC has added four innovations to its regulatory practices
since the beginning of the 1980s: the Systematic Analysis of
Licensing Performance (SALP); the use of Probabilistic Risk
Assessment (PRA) to determine the emphasis which a technical issue
receives; the Integrated Schedules Program (ISP); and a staff
reorganization along NSSS vendor lines. The SALP has been in use
for about five years, PRA explicitly for about two years (although
in one form or another since 1974), the ISP has been available to
the utilities for about three years, and the reorganization only
occurred in 1985.
As the name implies, the Systematic Analysis is being used to
evaluate all utilities on their licensing performance. The utility
is rated on its ability to meet licensing requirements and good
performance will reduce the frequency of future inspections.
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Conversely, a low rating will lead to more NRC inspections. The
staff noted that more inspections mean that there are more chances
of finding something wrong and that it may be hard to get rid of a
bad rating without real effort, but they see nothing wrong with this.
PRA is being used to give appropriate emphasis to technical
issues. This is used to rank the importance of various problems
which arise. The NRC now has an in-house capability to perform PRA,
although it still uses an occasional outside consultant.
Although only two plants have ISPs at present, the staff noted
that perhaps twenty to thirty other plants have submitted them. The
staff acknowledged that many utilities have decided against using
ISPs because they don't want to lock their maintenance schedules in
with the NRC.
The reorganization has brought together the technical
specialists in each discipline and the staff feels that this
approach will give them a more systematic view of plant problems.
The vendor groups are using PRA extensively when they find a problem.
4.2.3 Selection of Issues
While the NRC is moving toward PRA, the staff stressed that it
is still only a tool. If an issue is a serious concern to the staff
and they persuade the Commission, the utilities must react
regardless of the PRA calculations. The Commission itself also
exercises discretion, giving weight to issues which the staff does
not necessarily regard as serious. An example of this is
environmental qualification of safety equipment (EQ) which became a
political issue that the Commission embraced and forced upon the
industry without the support of the staff. The staff referred to EQ
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as a "top-down" issue. EQ has not been studied here because it has
had no effect on capacity factors.
The staff also generates issues either from internal research,
notification from utilities or vendors, and alerts from other
countries. The torus design modification requirements grew from an
accident at the West German plant Wurgassen in 1972.
The staff stated that timetables for response to issues are
based both upon the severity of the problem and the abilities of the
utilities to respond. The severity is generally determined by a
PRA. However, many plants do not have PRAs and so they cannot be
analyzed. The NRC staff admitted that political pressure may also
determine the schedule as in the case of environmental quality (EQ).
4.2.4 The Issues
The staff felt that the flaw in the Mark I Torus design was
indisputably a technical problem. They felt that there was
footdragging on adopting a schedule for the resolution of this
problem and they expressed a similar attitude towards IGSCC.
The staff was divided in its opinion on the requirements for
as-built piping drawings in IEB 79-14. Some felt that the absence
of precise plant drawings indicated that the plants could not have
been properly designed, while others stated that this was a paper
chase for some utilities. There was general agreement that this was
only a problem for the older plants because the newer ones had
better design control and, thus, better drawings.
The staff described the shutdowns required by the seismic
computer code bulletin (IEB 79-07) as an over reaction by the
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Commission. The problem was detected less than a month after TMI,
and the staff asserted that the Commission sought to show that it
could move decisively when a problem was detected.
The staff was surprised to discover that the steam generator
repairs were described as a regulatory issue. They pointed out that
this is a known technical issue and that an economic analysis should
dictate good practices. They offered the thought that the steam
generator inspections and repairs may be an example of regulations
which have enhanced capacity factor.
4.2.5 Discretion of the NRC
The staff acknowledged that there is discretion used in the
regulation of the utilities. They felt that the utilities which
come to Bethesda and make a good argument for a particular problem
solution get their way. Further, they emphasized the discretion of
the regional administrators, noting that some of the regions hold
paternalistic attitudes while others are adversarial. Commenting on
the nature of the entire regulatory process, the NRC concluded the
interview by stating that the US as a whole suffers from its
adversarial approach.
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Chapter 5
5.0 German Data
The German data was compiled from several sources. The VGB, the
Association of Large Power Plant Operators, collects and publishes
overall performance figures for all German plants each year. [111
"Atomwirtschaft", an FRG power industry journal, publishes graphs
showing the monthly operating power of each plant and gives a brief
definition of any outage or power reduction which occurred in the
past year. [17] The durations of the outages are precise, but the
descriptions are quite biief and further clarification was often
sought in the publication "Atom & Strom". [18] In cases where the
cause of an outage was still unclear, the utilities were consulted.
The FRG data lacks the level of detail of the US data. If a
plant was initially shut down for a refueling outage and then
remained down to perform other maintenance, the entire outage was
described as refueling. On occasions when other work might have
been done, there was no description of the critical path time
assigned to the non-refueling work. Some of the refueling outages
took over four months, and mention will be made here of the other
work done, but precise breakdowns of time spent during these outages
are unavailable. The performance figures used are energy
availability and not capacity factor because the utilities, as part
of the long-term agreement to buy coal, at times derate their
nuclear plants and instead supply power by running their coal
plants. These losses are economic losses and are not related to
plant performance; the plants were available to supply the energy
but were not permitted to do so because of the obligation to the
coal industry.
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5.1 Data Analysis
The overall performance of the commercial nuclear reactors of
the FRG has been considerably higher than that in the US, although a
comparison with Table 4.1 shows that BWRs have performed better in
the US. Table 5.1 shows the results for all reactors, for PWRs, and
BWRs over the ten year period of the study. The original comparison
of US and FRG performance by Hansen and Winje indicated regulatory
losses of less than 0.1X in the FRG while Table 5.1 shows a total
regulatory loss of 4.4X. The discrepancy arises because of
differences between the plant populations samples used in the two
studies. The earlier work only examined the 1980-83 performance of
PWRs which were 400 MWe or larger, which had been in operation
before 1980, and where NSSS and turbine-generator were manufactured
by the same vendor. Five German plants and one Swiss plant
qualified.
When the BWRs, the newer PWRs, and one small older PWR are added
to the database and the study period is expanded from 1975-84,
however, the regulatory outage figures increase. The BWRs show over
ten times as much regulatory loss as the PWRs. The regulatory
outages at all German plants were investigated and will now be
discussed.
5.2 Regulatory Losses in the FRG
Only five of the eleven FRG plants identified any regulatory
losses. The causes were different in each case and only two of the
issues have led to losses of more than a few percent or lasted more
than a year. Three PWRs had small losses and two BWRs had the large
losses.
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ENERGY AVAILABILITY LOSSES IN THE FRG
(in percent)
Type of Plant: All PWRs BWRs
Number of Plants: 11 7 4
Plant-Years: 85 56 29
Loss Category
Fuel 1.2% 1.4% 0.8X
Reactor Coolant 6.5 0.8 17.9
Steam Generator 0.4 0.5 0.0
Refueling 14.1 15.2 12.0
Turbine 0.6 0.3 1.1
Generator 0.7 1.0 0.1
Condenser 0.5 0.3 0.9
Regulatory 4.4 0.9 11.3
Other 2.4 1.4 4.7
Total Loss 30.9 21.8 48.9
Energy Availability 69.1 78.2 51.1
Table 5.1
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In 1976 the staff of Biblis-A discovered cracks in feedwater
tanks while inspecting during a refueling. They were given
permission to bring the plant back into service with the stipulation
that after 1,000 hours of operation (roughly forty-two days) they
shut down, reinspect, and perform repairs. The inspection and
repairs were completed in four weeks.
From 1980 through 1984, Unterweser was required to reduce power
output during several hot weeks in the summer, the losses amounted
to 1.0% in 1980, 1.3% in 1981, 4.8% in 1982, 2.9% in 1983, and 0.8%
in 1984. The plant's circulating water system draws its cooling
water from the Weser river and the temperature of the discharge
water is limited for environmental considerations.
The third small loss occurred at Biblis-B and cost the plant 19%
of its availability in 1984. A refueling was ordered by the state
civil court in Darmstadt because a fuel of greater enrichment than
that specified in the license had been installed at the previous
refueling. The plant was refueled in two short refuelings and ran
at reduced power until all the high enrichment fuel had been
replaced.
The two BWRs which had large regulatory losses had very
different experiences. Brunsbuttel was held out of service for two
years while the Wurgassen plant was only permitted to operate at 80%
of full power from 1976 through the end of 1981.
In June of 1978, a main steam nozzle leading into the
Brunsbuttel turbine failed. The turbine building filled with
reactor coolant and then the plant was shut down,but not before
radioactivity had escaped to the atmosphere. The plant, which had
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only come into service in February of 1977, was shut down to assess
and repair the damage. The senior operators were replaced for their
handling of the outage which led to the radiation release. The
plant was then out for all of 1979 for inspections and training of a
new staff. In January 1980 the RSK gave its approval for restart
but this was delayed until August 1980 when the BMI finally gave its
approval.- The BMI delayed the restart while it verified the
documentation of the training and inspections. Antinuclear
activists then held up the restart by two weeks in the
Administrative Court of Schleswig by protesting that an improvement
made at the plant affected nuclear safety systems and the license
should have been amended. The judge denied the action and the plant
finally started and operated for two weeks until a reactor trip from
instruments brought the unit down. Meanwhile, a higher court
ordered further review of the anti-nuclear objections until the end
of October 1980. In November 1980 the plant resumed normal
operation although it was down one more time for leaks detected in
the reactor coolant system. The six months of outage time in 1978
were attributed to the turbine while the ensuing two years were
called regulatory.
The Wurgassen plant was the most troubled plant in the history
of the German industry. Work was completed on Wurgassen by AEG in
March 1972 and operational tests then began. In April of that year
a pressure relief valve stuck open and admitted steam from the
reactor vessel into the condensation tank (the suppression pool or
Torus in American BWRs). The valve could not be resealed.
Operators tried to shed load instead of going to immediate shutdown
but the temperature in the condensation tank rose too quickly. The
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safety systems worked and the plant was brought down safely, but not before
large hydrodynamic loads were experienced inside the containment.
These loads burst a wall of the condensation tank which flooded the
area below the reactor. A typical layout for a German BWR is shown
in Figure 5.1.
The plant stayed down to assess the damage and repair the
condensation tank. After the accident, the state regulatory agency
in Dusseldorf became concerned about the plant's ability to shut
down in another accident. The plant lacked the four fully isolated,
independent emergency cooling systems which plants that were
receiving construction permits had at that time. It chose to impose
an 80% limitation on capacity while these shortcomings existed.
The repairs took a year and then operational tests resumed. A
further year elapsed and Preussen-Elektra had still not taken
ownership because the plant was not meeting performance standards.
A problem then developed in the turbine. Cracks were discovered in
both low pressure turbine shafts. New shafts were installed along
with new steam dryers and a new steam separator in the reactor
vessel to reduce the moisture content of the steam.
Finally, in November 1975, Preussen-Elektra took over ownership
of Wurgassen from AEG. The plant operated at 80% of full load from
then until it shut down to replace piping and components to bring
the plant in line with Basis Safety requirements. At that time
diesel generators were added and the core cooling systems were fully
isolated and--in September 1983 the plant was returned to service at
full power. This was the first time that the plant had operated at
100%.
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5.3 Non-Regulatory Losses
As can be seen from Table 5.1, the bulk of the losses came from
I refueling and maintenance at all plants and the Reactor Coolant
System in BWRs. The RCS losses were the result of a revised
approach to safety called the Basis Safety Concept, which will be
discussed in Section 5.4.
5.3.1 Refueling and Maintenance
This is the only category which would be expected to have
consistent losses exceeding ten percent. An investigation of the
3 longer outages, however, established that work going beyond ordinary
maintenance was performed during these outages. Three significant
issues will be discussed here.
The refueling outages at Biblis-A and Biblis-B in 1980 lasted
six months and four and a half months respectively. During those
I two outages, all the reactor vessel core barrel bolts were
replaced. The original bolts, of a higher strength than those used
in previous plants, were found to be subject to corrosion
embrittlement. The bolts were removed underwater and replaced with
bolts of the steel used in older designs.
The refueling outage at Neckarwestheim in 1979 took nearly six
months, during which time valves and other components in the
3 emergency core cooling system were replaced. A total of nearly 250
tons of steel was replaced during this outage. This was the only
I prolonged outage at an operating PWR to upgrade piping to meet the
Basis Safety requirements.
The last extended refueling outage occurred in 1983 when the
J Biblis-B plant was down for three months. The hydrogen cooling
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system for the generator failed, and although the generator was not
seriously damaged the repair work took time. This was not a nuclear
problem and could equally well have happened at a fossil plant.
5.3.2 Steam Generators
There have been only two outages of any length related to steam
generators in the FRG. Both steam generators at the 350 MWe
Obrigheim plant were completely replaced in 1983, the outage lasted
two and a half months, and was performed during a three and a half
month outage that was actually identified as refueling for the
entire length of the outage. Obrigheim is the oldest operating PWR
in the FRG, having come into service in March 1969. In 1984,
Biblis-A reported a one month outage for repair and testing after
detecting primary to secondary side leakage in one of the steam
generators. It must be noted that in sharp contrast to the US none
of the steam generator outage time has been called regulatory, not
even inspections.
The inspection standards used by the FRG utilities are higher
than those required by the KTA guidelines. In 1980, the PWR owners
and KWU became concerned about the possibility of steam generator
problems and began to increase their inspections. At
Neckarwestheim, in fact, the utility inspected 100% of the tubes
each year year from 1981 through 1983. They adopted this approach
in the hope of learning where the corrosion problems would occur and
now that they have identified the susceptible areas, they are
reducing the inspection levels. A new set of KTA rules governing
the steam generator has been proposed which reduce the extent and
frequency of inspections to a level equal to that of the Us.
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5.3.3 Fuel
The two Biblis units ran out of spent fuel storage space in 1979
and applied for license amendments to install high density fuel
storage racks in their spent fuel storage pools. The licenses were
delayed so long in the courts that the owner, facing a large winter
demand, elected to derate the plants rather than have them
unavailable. Biblis-A ran at fifty percent power for nearly five
months and Biblis-B at fifty percent from July through March of the
following year. Only Biblis-B received permission to install the
new racks on the grounds that since it was located further from the
river and its fuel pool wall was thicker than Biblis-A, it was more
capable of sustaining the shock of the explosion of a liquified
natural gas (LNG) tanker in the nearby river. The courts accepted
this resolution and Biblis-A ran at full power from the beginning of
December until its refueling in March at which time Biblis-B
returned to full power until its refueling in August of 1980.
5.3.4 Electrical Switchgear
In 1977, Biblis-A was derated by 7% in February when a 380 KV
transformer failed. A replacement transformer was not available
until June when the plant returned to full power.
5.4 The Basis Safety Concept
In 1972, materials engineers at the University of Stuttgart
began to reevaluate the nuclear industry's approach to the design of
pressure vessels and high pressure piping systems. Catastrophic
failure of these components was viewed as a possibility, albeit
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slight. At the same time, concern had arisen over the variety of
design standards and guidelines in use for these components. The
Basis Safety Concept (Basis Sicherheitskonzept) was proposed to
bring all the standards under one heading and at the same time raise
the standards to such a level that a catastrophic failure would be
incredible. [19]
Basis Safety began with materials, but it is also an overall
design concept. Members of the industry had begun to recognize that
some of the high strength steels being used lacked the flexibility
to respond to thermal and pressure shock and also that they became
brittle in the areas near welds. To respond to this problem, Basis
Safety proposed to use more forgiving material, and to increase the
pipe wall thickness; to reduce the number of welds and move those
welds which remained away stress points in the piping systems; and
finally, to locate the welas where in-service inspections could be
done easily.
The Reactor Safety Commission (RSK) adopted Basis Safety in
principle in 1977 and in 1979 published its first set of guidelines
on the subject. The guidelines, which have been updated several
times already, include stringent requirements on: material quality;
additional quality assurance by multiple parties independent of the
manufacturer; continuous in-service inspection; continuing programs
in research and development; and materials testing to verify the
validity of the standards. The regulations apply to plants under
construction, operating plants are immune to backfit requirements
except in cases of "imminent danger."
An event which lent momentum to the Basis Safety initiative was
the discovery of cracks in the reactor coolant piping of several
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German BWRs which were under construction at the time. The RSK,
acting on behalf of the Federal Minister of the Interior (BMI) began
an investigation into possible causes and the systems and components
affected. This study identified:
- parts of the main feedwater and steam lines;
- buffer tanks of the scram system;
- parts of the preheater and reheater-condensate
cooler in the turbine building;
- parts of the branch connections to the pressure-suppression
system;
- parts of the auxiliary steam supply system. [20]
The research identified the desirability of using materials which
are "more 'forgiving' to deviations from specificed manufacturing
parameters and have a high fracture toughness," [20] a clear echo of
the Basis Safety policies.
At the end of 1979, three BWRs were operating in the FG and a
fourth was undergoing its first startup tests. These plants were
never ordered to shut down, but they received gentle pressure from
the RSK with the warning of increased inspection requirements if
they didn't replace the pipe. From 1980 through 1983 each of the
four plants shut down for periods which lasted from twelve to
seventeen months. During this time they replaced all their reactor
coolant and feedwater piping as well as main steam isolation
valves. Some utilities also took the opportunity to replace the
pre-heaters and the economizers and to perform repairs on the
reactor vessel steam-water separator and the turbine moisture
separator. These were moves to improve long term availability. Over
this four year period, the BWRs in the Federal Republic had an
aggregate availability of 46.7%.
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The only PWR to be affected was the previously mentioned
Neckarwestheim. The primary coolant piping of the PWRs was already
of a high quality and it, along with many of the major components,
was reanalyzed but survived. Secondary side piping was replaced,
but all this work was done in the shadow of several refueling
outages.
5.5 IGSCC 
The only instance of IGSCC in Germany occurred at the 250 MWe
Gundremmingen-A plant which was shut down and decommissioned in
1977. This plant is not a part of this study because of its small
size. Gundremmigen-A is the only German plant which was built under
license to General Electric. The piping used in that plant followed
the GE specifications and was the same Type 304 unstabilized
austenitic stainless steel used in the US BWRs. The plant was
already down for repairs following as accident when the IGSCC was
discovered and the extent determined. The decision to decommission
was made based on the age of the plant and its small contribution to
overall capacity.
The newer German plants use Type 347 stainless steel in all
piping less than twelve inches in diameter and clad the inside of
the larger pipes with the 347. This steel, which is difficult to
weld, is stabilized against sensitization and can't develop IGSCC.
The German industry selected this material to eliminate the
possibility of IGSCC even though the chances of it-occurring seemed
remote at the time.
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5.6 Seismic Design Standards
The KTA adopted the seismic spectrum and seismic analysis
regulations of the AEC/NRC in 1975. While no zone in the FRG is as
active as the Pacific Coast of the US, most of the country bears a
seismic resemblance to the American East and Midwest. The dynamic
analysis regulations of the FRG stipulate that they must design to
the greatest load sustained from a seismic event, a chemical
explosion (such as an LNG tanker on a river near the plant), or a
jet airplane crash. The aircrash, when analyzed, is a more severe
loading problem than a seismic event. The aircrash stipulation was
added in the early 1970s and affected several plants in this study
while they were under construction. There was no effect on
operating plants.
The analytical capabilities of the two countries are and have
been comparable. Like the US, the FRG went through a period in the
late 1970s of intensive reanalysis of the seismic designs of the
plants under construction and in design. They investigated every
component and now KWU feels it has established a store of knowledge
large enough to perform analysis by similarity in some cases.
The analysis has moved the FRG towards a "soft" design which
uses almost no snubbers in the new plants. The older plants do have
snubbers and they resisted the pressure to add more snubbers in the
late 1970s and early 1980s. Their resistance paid off because by
1982 the analysis indicated that fewer snubbers rather than more
increased the survivability of the piping systems. When piping is
modified at the old plants, some snubbers are removed, but there is
no active program to remove the installed snubbers.
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The only snubbers that have been added are to prevent damage
from pipe whip. During the intense analysis period from 1976 to
1982 KWU discovered that some of the greatest dynamic loads come
from pipe breaks and the resulting pipe whip. They have reanalyzed
for this problem and the utilities, on their own initiative, have
added snubbers.
5.7 In-Service Inspection
The present KTA rules for inspection of the primary system
components and piping equal or exceed those of the US. All welds in
the reactor vessel and primary piping must be inspected at least
once every four years. [21] The inspections are performed by the
utilities using remotely operated ultrasonic testing equipment. The
TUVs witness the inspections and will actually perform a few tests
to verify the quality of the utilities, inspections. A revision of
the KTA rules has been proposed, using the ASME code as a guide to
reduce the frequency of inspections. The standards for the reactor
vessel will remain the same but the period for piping and other
components will be extended to eight years. The utilities are
encouraging this revision but other members of the KTA are reluctant
to make this change; it is unclear when, if ever, this rule will be
revised.
5.8 No-Loss Regulatory Issues
There have been a few instances in the FRG of regulatory issues
which have led to work at operating plants but had no effect on
operations. Like the US, the FRG has added hydrogen recombiner
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equipment in the aftermath of the accident at TMI. Every plant in
the FRG has been required to add a backup secondary side cooling
system. This consists of an extra cooling tower, reserve water
supply, pumps, and diesel generators. The backup cooling system
must be located at a distance from the original cooling system so
that they won't be damaged simultaneously by the same airplane crash.
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Chapter 6
6.0 The Effects of Regulation
The picture which can be drawn from the comparison of US and FRG
data illustrates that most of the difference in regulatory losses in
the two countries is a matter of definition. In the FRG, the only
issues which have been called regulatory were a derating of an
operating plant, an order to train a new staff after an accident,
and some environmental operating limits. In the US the regulatory
issues encompassed design flaws (IGSCC and torus modifications);
inspections of the primary system boundary, either in the steam
generators or the reactor coolant system; leaks or potential leaks
in the primary system boundary in the form of Technical
Specification violations for the steam generators or reactor coolant
system; and reanalysis of the seismic design criteria (the seismic
bulletins, the seismic computer code, and plant specific seismic
issues).
6.1 The Issues Side by Side
Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking was a problem in both
countries but in Germany was mostly avoided by the selection of Type
347 steel. The one plant that did have the problem never returned
to service. There was no question on the part of the US industry
that this was a technical problem, and that the piping was
eventually going to crack. The only question concerned how
extensive the repairs needed to be. Many in the US have argued that
increased inspections, weld overlay, and the leak-before-break
concept make immediate full-scale pipe replacement unnecessary.
Under similar circumstances the German industry rejected this
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approach. The knowledge that the material chosen for the reactor
coolant and feedwater piping might crack was enough to prompt the
Basis Safety backfits. The solution may not have been agreeable to
all members of the industry, but it was accepted over this option of
increased inspections.
The accident at Wurgassen in 1972 showed the German industry the
design flaw in the condensation tank and tipped off the US to
possible flaws in the Mark I Torus. Even after the repairs were
completed at Wurgassen, the plant was held to 80Z of full power for
many years.l The US, after verifying that this could be a
problem, studied the problem from 1975 to 1979 before taking action,
and many utlities stated that they needed still more time. None of
the US plants were ever subject to an 80 power restriction.
The US industry has credited regulation with over half of all
the losses suffered by steam generators from 1975 to 1984, while
none of the steam generator losses in the FRG have been regulatory.
The German industry voluntarily increased its inspections when it
saw the trouble with the American steam generators, in the hope of
2identifying trouble spots and taking preventive action. The
locations of corrosion must be identified and measures taken before
tube plugging becomes necessary. Once a tube is plugged, the heat
1 This regulatory action is, at least, questionable; there is
little if any increase in safety in bringing down a plant from only
80Z power under accident conditions instead of the full 100%.
2 This volunteerism should not be confused with the "voluntary"
pipe replacement in the BWRs. In the case of steam generator
inspections there was no hint of a desire for increased inspections
from the regulators.
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transfer capacity of the steam generator is reduced and the plant
will produce less power. The US and FRG regulations for tube
plugging both use a threshold of 50% wall thinning. The FRG regards
this as a plant availability problem and some US utilities
acknowledged that there was little reason to call this regulatory.
The attitude towards inspections of the primary system boundary
is markedly different in the two countries. The FRG inspection
standards have equaled or exceeded the US in every category and none
of the time spent has been labeled regulatory. As with steam
generators, inspections are viewed as a way to maintain high
availability. Piping and components have failed, and will continue
to do so, even under a policy of Basis Safety, and inspections are
the only way to anticipate and prevent these failures. Inspections
are performed at fossil as well as nuclear power plants; inspections
are a part of normal plant operations.
A reasonable parallel may be drawn between the outages at
Brunsbuttel and TMI-1. The American plant, although undamaged, was
of a similar design and operated by the same organization as TMI-2.
The unit was already shut down for refueling and in the aftermath of
the accident, when operator error was shown to have contributed to
the problem, the NRC had reason to hold the plant down for
inspection and training. The response to the Brunsbuttel accident,
which predated TMI by nearly a year, seemed unusually harsh - no
permanent damage was done and the total release of radiation was
small - but the doubts about the operation team's abilities led to a
complete replacement of operators and a two year outage. This
response, although draconian, is perhaps more suitable than the
seven years of outage at TMI-1.
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Of the major regulatory issues, only the seismic reanalysis in
the US has no parallel in the FRG. The NRC and the utilities have
acknowledged that the shut down order for the seismic computer code
problem was an overreaction, which was related to the fact that it
occurred less than a month after TMI. (Some U.S. observers
suggested that the Commission may have sought to maintain its
credibility by showing that it could react decisively to a problem.)
The other seismic bulletins and the plant specific seismic
issues lack the political implications of the computer code issue
but have accounted for nearly five times as much lost capacity. The
NRC went well beyond the German response to the improvements in
analytical capabilities. The German regulators' reluctance to
demand backfits while the analysis was still being developed served
the industry well as the new analysis finally showed that fewer,
rather than more, snubbers were desirable. In comparison with the
FRG, the US reanalysis and backfit requirements appear to have been
precipitous.
The FRG has never challenged the overall seismic design of a
plant as has happened at a few US plants. In one instance, when
Biblis-B was under construction and using a higher design standard
that its sister plant, KWU reviewed the seismic design of Biblis-A
anticipating a question from the regulators. The question never
came but the plant met the higher design standard anyway.
6.2 Differences in Approach
Both industries suffered losses due to the replacement of main
coolant piping. The technical problems were different, the IGSCC in
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the US had caused the austenitic steel to leak, while in the FRG the
high strength ferritic steel was regarded as too brittle. The
German industry may refer to the pipe replacement at the four BWRs
as voluntary, but there is ample evidence to suggest that more than
"gentle pressure" was applied by the regulators in their move to
promote Basis Safety. [22] The approach to developing the technical
solution to these two problems was quite different and it is worth
exploring those differences here.
Basis Safety is not so much revolutionary as it is
evolutionary. The change in design standards came when the
technology improved: new materials; materials manufacturing
techniques; analytical techniques; and inspection abilities. These
innovations were then set against the backdrop of experience which
showed the need for inspections and the recognition of designs which
led to fatigue and possible failure.
In Germany, the response was the formulation of new
regulations. In the US, the manufacturers and utilities adopted a
similar approach of their own accord. The NRC specified that the
cracked pipe be replaced with pipe immune to IGSCC, but they left it
to the industry to choose the material, the design, and installation
methods. When General Electric offered its bid to utilities
planning to replace damaged piping, the design embodied the concepts
of Basis Safety. The material was of a higher grade, there were
fewer welds, those welds which remained were distant from stress
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points and in locations where inspections could be done easily, and
the welding techniques were improved.
A relevant question to ask in this comparison is of the relative
timing of the responses? It is not enough to say that the industry
would have arrived at the same point of design without regulation if
that point is reached five years later. The redesigned BWR piping
in the US was offered at about the same time that the new piping was
being installed in the BWRs in the FRG, but this may have happened
because the German industry had forced the frontiers and the US
industry benefitted from this work. How much work was done in
isolation and how much together is unclear.
What is clear, however, is that the original requirements for
inspection, leak detection, and allowable leakage rates were the
cause of the enhanced design in both countries. The inspection and
leak detection requirements provided the alert to design
deficiencies, and the leakage limits provided the economic incentive
to replace the piping. To avoid the requirement to shut down for
frequent inspections and repairs, it became advantageous to install
materials of higher quality and lower failure probability.
6.3 Lessons Learned
The FRG has had more capacity loss due to regulation than it has
admitted, and the US less. The total for the FRG agruably should
include the losses for pipe replacement under Basis Safety (although
the possibility that some pipe replacement losses would have been
incurred even in the absence of the Basis Safety initiative must
also be recognized). This would add 5.4% for the four BWRs, and
0.5% for the PWR Neckarwestheim. The US should arguably remove steam
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generator repairs (0.9X) and perhaps the steam generator inspections
and Tech Spec violations (0.4Z each) on the grounds that steam'
generators need to be inspected because they suffer from corrosion
which causes leaks, and when there is a chance of a leak, corrective
action must be taken. The same arguments can be applied to
inspections and Tech Spec violations of the reactor coolant system |
(0.2X and 0.11 respectively). The result of all these additions and
subtractions is shown in Table 6.1, which suggests the surprising
conclusion that regulatory losses have actually been greater in the
FRG than the US. It follows that regulation is not the cause of the
poorer performance of the US nuclear industry with respect to that
of the FRG.
It must be noted here that not all US utilities have had great
losses attributed to regulation, and also that some have operated on
a par with the FRG plants. The key similarities between US and FRG
utilities detected during the interviews are:
(a) inspection levels above the regulatory standards;
(b) acknowledgement of problems before the regulatory authority
becomes concerned;
(c) development of resolutions in anticipation of or to forestall
regulatory action; and
(d) a willingness and an ability to spend money to fix a problem.
Based on the data and the interviews, it is conjectured that
those utilities which performed inspections above and beyond the
requirements were the utilities which performed well overall. These
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RECALCULATED REGULATORY LOSSES
(in percent)
US FRG
As Stated 10.7X 4.4%
Basis Safety
Backfits 5.9
Steam Generator
Repairs (0.9)
Steam Generator
Inspections (0.4)
Steam Generator
Tech Spec (0.4)
RCS Inspections (0.2)
RCS Tech Spec (0.1)
Total Losses 8.7 10.3
Table 6.1
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utilities may have been able to identify problems long before they
became industry wide issues, whereas those which inspected
reluctantly and only in accordance with regulations were likely to
be less prepared and may have lost significant amounts of capacity
when industry problems were discovered. The latter may also have
had problems because they had done fewer inspections and didn't know
their plants and their shortcomings as well, although this is not
clear from the investigation.
Caution must be exercised here. This should in no way be
construed as a call for more severe inspection requirements.
Inspection regulations must set a minimum threshold for safety.
Plant availability is the responsibility of the utilities and they
must decide how to allocate their resources to make the plants
perform well. A concern expressed by utilities in both countries is
that if they follow higher inspection standards, the regulators will
require that those standards be adopted permanently. This must not
happen. The utilities must have the flexibility to investigate an
issue for a few years and when they have concluded their
investigation, turn their attention to other questions, as the
Germans have done recently with steam generators.
The utilities which have been willing to acknowledge a problem
are the ones which can begin working on resolutions. It has not
been easy for some utilites to acknowledge a problem because of the
political nature of nuclear power. This has been a particular
problem for utilities with ongoing construction. Every new problem
detected at an operating plant tends to raise new questions about
the decision to invest in a new plant. This tends to promote a
wait-and-see attitude which allows problems to grow, partly in the
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hope that other plants will also develop the problem and an industry
wide consensus will develop on the need for work. This wait-and-see
attitude is not, however, peculiar to utilities with new
construction. Those with no new construction work and only
operating plants often want to identify all the other victims of a
problem when they apply to their PUC for compensation for money
spent. This approach, unfortunately, again allows a problem to grow
before a solution is tried.
The data and the interviews suggest that the NRC has been and is
growing more receptive to proposals to extend implementation
schedules presented by utilities which show a detailed understanding
of the problem and its resolution. The utilites which have
presented detailed repair plants to the NRC on seismic backfits and
torus modifications are the ones that have been able to stretch out
their repairs over several years with little impact on operations.
Those utilities which have used this approach successfully have
usually offered to increase on-line surveillance over the course of
the repair period.
6.4 Future Work
This thesis has concluded that regulation is not the cause of
poor U.S. nuclear power performance relative to the FRG. It has
suggested that the investment in inspections, early recognition of
problems, and development of solutions in advance of regulatory
action are all keys to good performance. Future work that could
shed further light on the latter issue would consist of an
investigation of inspection practices in the U.S. and abroad to try
to correlate them with performance.
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Another factor that was not specifically addressed in the
present study but which may explain some of the differences in
performance and which deserves further analysis is the effect of
differences in the financial environment of different utilities.
For example, German utilities are generally both able and willing to
spend money on plant improvements. However, not all US utilities
are willing to spend money even if they are able to do so; those
with ongoing construction projects may be deterred from making
changes in operating plants because of the risk of prejudicing
public perceptions concerning the wisdom of the new investments.
Moreover, not all US utilites which are willing to spend money on
plant improvements are able to do so. The PUCs have become
increasingly reluctant to allow the utilities to spend money. They
are demanding ample justification of all expenditures, much of this
in the form of examples of other utilities which have already done
the same work. This tends to discourage early preventive
maintenance.
Another problem which may prevent some U.S. utilities from
spending money when they need it is the so-called cost cap. A few
PUCs have already established and others are considering a ceiling
on plant expenditures above which the utilities must seek the
approval of the PUC to perform the work. Not only does this delay
the work but it may also call upon the PUC to make technical
assessments that it is unqualified to make. This is not to say that
the PUC should abrogate its right to review expenditures, but it
should not command that the utilities give up their responsibility
to make decisions for their plants. If the PUCs want to ensure that
the expenditures are reasonable, they may want to consider setting
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penalties for low performance, but to make these disincentives
effective work they should be coupled with incentives for high
performance.
Differences in financial influences and incentives at the
construction stage may also be important. Nuclear power plants are
built in the FRG in roughly seven or eight years. The utilities pay
for the plants with accumulated revenues, loans, and, if they
choose, current revenues. They are allowed to incorporate part of
the interest on the loans in the electric rates prior to completion
of construction (usually referred to as CWIP in the US). The
interest and inflation rates in the FRG have both been lower than in
the US over the past twenty years.
The electric utility industry in the FRG is obligated to
purchase coal from the German coal industry. This domestic coal is
expensive and drives up the cost of electricity. In comparison,
nuclear power is economically attractive.
The Price Commission in each state has the right to review all
expenditures before allowing them into the rate base. However, the
Price Commissions have shown greater interest in making sure that a
utility's costs are consistent with other German utilities than
determining whether the costs were the lowest attainable. The only
cost review that is done comes when the project is first proposed.
If the costs are in line with other projects in the FRG, the utility
never has to submit another cost analysis for approval by the
regulators.
In the US, by contrast, electricity from coal-fired plants is
not as expensive as in Germany. Nuclear plants have taken an
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average of ten to twelve years to build, CWIP has been allowed in
only a few cases, and the utilities are subject to ongoing
cost-justification reviews during construction and later during
operations. Under these pressures, the US utilities find themselves
forced to give great consideration to construction costs. The
question is whether, as a result of these differences, the German
utilities have tended to invest in higher cost, but also quality
systems during the construction phase.
Recommendations for future work that focus on these financial
and economic issues include:
o A comparison of the quality of components, both major and
minor, installed in plants in both countries:
A comparison of designs for reliability and maintainability.
o A comparative investigation of economic incentives for good
performance.
o Comparative research on economic incentives to build in high
quality from the outset, including the possibility of performance
guarantees in future contracts.
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APPENDIX 1
U. S. PLANTS USED IN THIS STUDY
PLANT NAME NET RATING
ARKANSAS 1 820 MWe
ARKANSAS 2 912 MWe
BEAVER VALLEY 1 852 MWe
BROWNS FERRY 1 1065 MWe
BROWNS FERRY 2 1065 MWe
BROWNS FERRY 3 1065 MWe
BRUNSWICK 1 821 MWe
BRUNSWICK 2 821 MWe
CALVERT CLIFFS 1 880 MWe
CALVERT CLIFFS 2 880 MWe
CONN YANKEE--HADDAM 582 MWe
COOK 1 1054 MWe
COOK 2 1100 MWe
COOPER STATION 778 MWe
CRYSTAL RIVER 3 856 MWe
DAVIS-BESSE 1 906 MWe
DRESDEN 2 794 MWe
DRESDEN 3 794 MWe
DUANE ARNOLD 515 MWe
FARLEY 1 .829 MWe
FARLEY 2 829 MWe
TYPE
PWR
PWR
PWR
BWR
BWR
BWR
BWR
BWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
BWR
PWR
PWR
BWR
BWR
BWR
PWR
PWR
COMMERCIAL:
1/75
4/80
3/77
8/74
3/75
3/77
4/77
12/75
6/75
4/77
1/68
9/75
7/78
7/74
4/77
4/78
7/72
1/72
2/75
12/77
8/81
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PLANT NAME
FITZPATRICK
FORT CALHOUN
GINNA
HATCH 1
HATCH 2
INDIAN POINT 2
INDIAN POINT 3
KEWAUNEE 1
LASALLE 1
LASALLE 2
MAINE YANKEE
MCGUIRE 1
MCGUIRE 2
MILLSTONE POINT 1
MILLSTONE POINT 2
MONTICELLO
NINE MILE POINT
NORTH ANNA 1
NORTH ANNA 2
OCONEE 1
OCONEE 2
OCONEE 3
OYSTER CREEK
NET RATING
821 MWe
478 MWe
490 MWe
786 MWe
784 MWe
873 MWe
965 MWe
535 MWe
1078 MWe
1078 MWe
825 MWe
1180 MWe
1180 MWe
660 MWe
870 MWe
545 MWe
610
907
907
887
887
887
650
TYPE
BWR
PWR
PWR
BWR
BWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
BWR
BWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
BWR
PWR
BWR
BWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
BWR
MWe
MWe
MWe
MWe
MWe
MWe
MWe
COMMERCIAL:
8/75
7/74
4/70
1/76
10/79
7/74
9/76
7/74
1/84
11/84
1/73
12/81
3/84
4/71
1/76
8/71
1/70
7/78
1/81
8/73
10/74
'1/75
1/70
-84-
--- I
J
PLANT NAME
PALISADES
PEACH BOTTOM 2
PEACH BOTTOM 3
PILGRIM 1
POINT BEACH 1
POINT BEACH 2
PRAIRIE ISLAND 1
PRAIRIE ISLAND 2
QUAD CITIES 1
QUAD CITIES 2
RANCHO SECO
ROBINSON 2
SALEM 1
SALEM 2
SAN ONOFRE 1
SAN ONOFRE 2
SAN ONOFRE 3
SEQUOYAH 1
SEQUOYA 2
ST. LUCIE 1
ST. LUCIE 2
SUMMER 1
SURRY 1
NET RATING
740 MWe
1065 MWe
1065 MWe
668 MWe
497 MWe
497 MWe
530 MWe
530 MWe
789 MWe
789 MWe
917 MWe
730 MWe
1090 MWe
1115 MWe
430 MWe
1087 MWe
1087 MWe
1148 MWe
1148 MWe
846 MWe
804 MWe
900 MWe
788 MWe
TYPE
PWR
BWR
BWR
BWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
BWR
BWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
COMMERCIAL:
1/72
8/74
1/75
1/73
1/71
5/73
1/74
1/75
3/73
4/73
5/75
4/71
7/77
11/81
1/68
9/83
4/84
7/81
6/82
1/77
9/83
1/84
1/73
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PLANT NAME
SURRY 2
SUSQUEHANNA 1
THREE MILE ISLAND 1
THREE MILE ISLAND 2
TROJAN
TURKEY POINT 3
TURKEY POINT 4
VERMONT YANKEE
ZION 1
ZION 2
NET RATING
788 MWe
TYPE
PWR
1065 MWe
819 MWe
906 MWe
1130 MWe
693 MWe
BWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
BWR
PWR
PWR
693 MWe
514 MWe
1040 MWe
1040 MWe
COMMERCIAL:
5/73
7/83
10/74
1/79
6/76
1/73
10/73
12/72
1/74
10/74
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APPENDIX 2
F. R. G. PLANTS USED IN THIS STUDY
PLANT NAME NET RATING
BIBLIS-A 1146 MWe
BIBLIS-B
BRUNSBUTTEL
GRAFENRHEINFELD
ISAR-1
NECKARWESTHEIM-1
OBRIGHEIM
PHILLIPSBURG-1
STADE
UNTERWESER
WURGASSEN
1240 MWe
771 MWe
1235 MWe
907 MWe
795 MWe
340 MWe
864 MWe
630 MWe
1230 MWe
640 MWe
TYPE
PWR
PWR
BWR
PWR
BWR
PWR
PWR
BWR
PWR
PWR
BWR
COMMERCIAL:
3/75
1/77
2/77
6/82
3/79
12/76
3/69
2/80
5/72
10/79
11/75
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APPENDIX .3
OPEC-2 CAuSE CODES
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Appendix 4
Glossary of Acronyms
AE Architect/Engineer
AEC Atomic Energy Commission
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers
BMI Federal Ministry of the Interior
BWR Boiling Water Reactor
CEO Chief Executive Officer
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
EPRI Electric Power Research Institute]5 GE General Electric Company
GRS Reactor Safety Company
IEB Inspection and Enforcement BulletinTI] IGSCC Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking
INPO Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
.j ISP Integrated Schedule Program
KTA Nuclear Safety Standard Commission
j fKWU Kraftwerk Union
LWR Light Water Reactor
MWe Megawatts Electric
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NSSS Nuclear Steam Supply System
PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment
PUC Public Utility Commission
PWR Pressurized Water Reactor
RSK Reactor Safety Commission
SALP Systematic Assessment of Licensing Performance
TMI Three Mile Island
TUV Technical Inspection Agency
VGB Association of Large Power Producers
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